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Abstract
Several experiments show that feedback transmission mechanisms mitigate opportunistic be-
havior in social dilemmas. The source of this eﬀect, especially in a repeated interaction,
nonetheless remains obscure. This study provides a novel empirical testbed for channels by
which feedback may aﬀect behavior in a repeated public goods game. One is related to strate-
gic signaling. The other involves aversion to others' expressed disapproval. The presence of
feedback is found to foster pro-social behavior. The data favour the non-monetary sanctioning
explanation rather than the signaling hypothesis.
Keywords: Public goods game, Voluntary Contribution Mechanism, Feedback, Signaling,
Non-monetary sanctioning.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, D83.
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1 Introduction
In many economic environments, such as online trading, people interact repeatedly, remotely and
anonymously. Non-verbal feedback is often used as an institutional remedy against moral hazard
in these situations. For instance, users of online trading platforms (like Amazon or eBay) may
rate the other traders in a positive, neutral, or negative way. Moreover, the availability of negative
feedback is a key element of such rating systems. For instance, Amazon describes the rating
system as follows: we focus on negative feedback ratings as a percentage of total feedback ratings
(the "Negative Feedback Rate") as an indicator of seller performance. Our very best sellers have
a close to 0% Negative Feedback Rate. In the same vein, several experimental studies (discussed
in the next section) report that (i) institutions based on feedback transmission are capable of
enforcing norms of pro-social behavior when individual rationality conﬂicts with social interest,
and that (ii) the negative feedback happens to be a more powerfull tool for achieving social
eﬃciency than the positive feedback.
Although feedback transmission might be considered as a reputation building mechanism in
repeated social dilemmas (Bolton, Katok, and Ockenfels, 2004), recent experiments suggest that
it may aﬀect human behavior through diﬀerent channels: one involves strategic signaling (i.e.
how the feedback recipient should act in the future), the other one stems from the idea that
agents' utility may not only depend on the monetary gains generated by decisions, but also on the
awareness of other people's perception (i.e. approval or disapproval) of these decisions.
This paper further explores the root underlying the behavioral eﬀect of the transmission of
non-verbal feedback in repeated social dilemmas, and oﬀers a new methodology to disentangle
the signaling and the sanctioning function of this mechanism. Experimental design builds on the
Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003) sound intuition that under both partner matching
(where the same groups of players interact many times) and stranger matching (where groups
change after each interaction), feedback may work as a non-mentary sanctioning device, but only
the former also allows for strategic signaling. At the same time, the experimental methodology
neutralizes the undesired and potentially confoudning eﬀects of the matching protocol on subjects'
behavior (Andreoni and Croson, 2008).
In line with some of the previous experiments, the presence of feedback transmitted via costless
disapproval points is found to signiﬁcantly foster pro-social behavior. Furthermore, the data favour
the non-monetary punishment explanation rather than the strategic signaling hypothesis.
2 Related literature
In a seminal contribution, Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003) use a repeated public
goods game, based on the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM in short). After each round,
every subject observes his group members' contributions, sends a message containing disapproval
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points to each group member, and is informed about the sum of points received from others.
Masclet et al. conjecture that the transmission of feedback in a repeated interaction may aﬀect
subjects' behavior in two distinct ways. First, it may serve as an information transmission device
prior to the next round  for instance, signals may convey a warning that the sender will decrease his
future contribution unless the receiver increases his. Second, being aware of others' opinions may
operate as a non-monetary sanction/reward  for instance, people may display an aversion to being
disapproved/a preference for being approved, and act less opportunistically so as to avoid/deserve
it (Holländer, 1990). They argue that these two eﬀects may be separated by contrasting subjects'
behavior under partner and stranger matching. Intuitively, in the former setting the eﬀect of such
ex post communication may stem from both strategic information transmission and disapproval-
aversion, while in the latter behavioral eﬀects may only be a matter of subjects' aversion to
disapproval. In their experiment, the presence of communication under partner matching yields
signiﬁcantly higher contributions than under stranger matching, which supports the strategic
signaling hypothesis. In a related study, Peeters and Vorsatz (2013) use a similar experimental
game and introduce treatments in which every subject may transmit an emoticon (a frowny in
one condition, a smiley in the other) to each partner, and then is informed about the number of
received emoticons. Comparing patterns of behavior under partner matching (where a moderate,
yet statistically insigniﬁcant, eﬀect of ex post communication is observed) and stranger matching
(where there is virtually no eﬀect of communication), the paper concludes that ex post messages
mainly facilitate the exchange of strategic information before an upcoming round.
On the other hand, some experimental studies suggest that the behavioral eﬀect of feedback
may be driven by aversion to other's expressed disapproval. López-Pérez and Vorsatz (2010) report
that the availability of ﬁxed-form, post-play messages containing judgments of other participants'
decisions makes subjects more cooperative in a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game. Ellingsen and
Johannesson (2008) and Xiao and Houser (2009) identify the same eﬀect on altruism in subjects
playing a dictator game when a free-form, post-play communication is possible. Czap, Czap,
Khachaturyan, Burbach, and Lynne (2011) implement a two-stage game in which a common-pool
resource is used by a group of subjects, out of which some have private incentives to produce
publicly undesirable externalities. They ﬁnd that the reception of a negative emotional feedback
(via frownies) after the ﬁrst stage reduces externalities in the second stage, while providing positive
feedback (via smilies) does the opposite. Dugar (2010) studies a repeated weakest-link coordination
game and ﬁnds that the introduction of disapproval points helps groups of players converge towards
the Pareto-superior Nash equilibrium, while approval points bring no improvement in this respect,
inhibiting a fast convergence to the Pareto-inferior Nash equilibrium. Dugar (2013) ﬁnds that the
availability of disapproval points generates higher contributions than approval points in a ﬁxed-
group VCM game based on Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003), and that combining
both kinds of points brings a further improvement with this respect. Dugar attributes the eﬀects
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observed in these two experiments to an asymmetrical sensitivity to approval and disapproval.
3 Empirical strategy
The experimental methodology introduced by Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003) and
subsequently used by Peeters and Vorsatz (2013) has its strenghts and weaknesses for separating
the signaling dimension and the sanctioning dimension of non-verbal feedback in a repeated inter-
action. Its advantage is that it identiﬁes environments where both of these phenomena either can
or cannot co-exist. The main disadvantage is that these environments may aﬀect behavior simul-
taneously to the content of messages, and that these behavioral eﬀects are highly unpredictable.
As a simple illustration of the above problem, consider a situation where only two factors aﬀect
contributions: received feedback and matching protocol. Since both eﬀects arise simulatenously,
future contributions are aﬀected not only by past communication, but also by the matching pro-
tocol. The two eﬀects should not be considered orthogonal: assuming that the content of feedback
is correlated with own and others' past behavior (which is the case in most studies of this type
of communication, including this one), future messages depend on past contributions, so that the
very nature of feedback is also inﬂuenced by the matching protocol. Consequently, the matching
protocol eﬀect is a confound that aggravates the isolation of the actual relationship between com-
munication and contributions in a repeated game. Thus, the most general solution to this issue is
an experimental design in which actions are uncorrelated with the matching scheme.1
The central methodological challenge for this study is to create an experimental environment
that allows for diﬀerent features of feedback, at the same time ruling out the unobserved eﬀect of
the matching protocol on decisions. To this end, I introduce a novel uniform matching protocol
where a random process decides whether groups are maintained or broken up. In each round of
a repeated game, subjects decide upon their level on contribution before learning whether their
group prevails until next round. This design neutralizes the unwanted forward-looking eﬀects of
1Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003) oﬀer a way to control for the matching protocol eﬀects with a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach: in every session subjects play a sequence of rounds without communication, which
is followed by an analogous sequence with communication, and then another sequence without communication,
holding the matching protocol constant. They argue that since subjects' behavior is similar in the initial sequence
under both matching schemes, thus the diﬀerences observed in the second stage are unlikely to stem from the
matching protocol eﬀects. However, it should be also noticed that a conclusive comparison in the second stage is
only possible in the absence of a systematic partner-stranger diﬀerence in the ﬁrst stage. Unfortunately, scenarios
where observations are neutral to matching protocol eﬀects are far from being a regularity in lab experiments on
public goods games. In a related study, Peeters and Vorsatz (2013) use a classical between-subject design and
observe systematic matching protocol eﬀects: in each round of every treatment, partner matching induces higher
contributions than stranger matching (see the working paper version of their study, Peeters and Vorsatz (2009)).
Moreover, the matching protocol eﬀects are absent in only 4 out of 13 experiments overviewed by Andreoni and
Croson (2008). In 5 cases partner matching brings higher contribution than stranger matching, in the remaining 4
cases the opposite occurs.
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diﬀerent matching protocols on contributions, while controlling for the backward-looking factors
(as discussed in the next section). The transmission of feedback, in turn, only takes place after the
fate of groups is known to subjects. Consequently, the eﬀect of communication can be captured
in two diﬀerent strategic contexts: when groups prevail from one period to another, and when
they change between rounds. In line with Masclet et al.'s original argument, strategic information
transmission is only possible in the former case, while non-monetary punishment may occur in
both cases.
Following several previous studies (Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval, 2003; Noussair and
Tucker, 2005; Dugar, 2010, 2013), I implement a communication protocol based on numerical ex
post messages framed as disapproval points. In order to assure the interpretability of messages, the
VCM game is played by groups of two subjects, so in each round every participant learns about
other group member's contribution, sends a message and receives one in return. Consequently,
messages may be easily matched to individual actions, which creates an environment that (i)
facilitates agents' comprehension of non-verbal content, and (ii) allows the experimenter to trace
the relationship between individual messages and individual contributions.2 Moreover, it is of
common knowledge that no group ever re-appears after having been dissolved, which is aimed at
ruling out the possibility of sending future-oriented signals between subjects who are about to
cease interacting.
3.1 Experimental game and conditions
Experimental game. Pairs of subjects play the following version of the VCM game. Each player
holds an initial endowment of 15 Experimental Currency Units (ECU), and may contribute any
part of it to the common pool.3 Decisions are made simultaneously and the amount accumulated
in the common pool is then multiplied by 1.5 and re-transferred to group members in equal parts.
Thus, the gain of player i who contributes Ni and interacts with player j who contributes Mj
equals:
Gaini = 15− 0.25×Ni + 0.75×Mj (1)
Although the social welfare is maximized when each player contributes his entire endowment,
the dominant strategy is to contribute nothing.4 Therefore, the standard game theory predicts
2This two-person design, motivated by the clarity of communication, comes as a departure from the four-person
design used in the related studies by Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003) and Peeters and Vorsatz (2013).
However, experimentals by Isaac and Walker (1988) and Isaac, Walker, and Williams (1994) suggest that the group
size does not per se aﬀect contributions in VCM.
3In the lab implementation, contributions may only take integer values between 0 ECU and 15 ECU.
4To avoid framing eﬀects, instructions use neutral phrasing: I use expressions such as players and group members
rather than partners, and contributions are never related to cooperation. See Rege and Telle (2004) for evidence on
framing eﬀects in public goods experiments.
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that in the unique Nash equilibrium all players contribute nothing.
Baseline condition. In the baseline condition (BC), the game is repeated as follows. In each
occurrence, subjects (i) decide upon their contribution to the common pool, (ii) learn whether
their current group survives until the next round, and ﬁnally (iii) observe the other group member's
contribution, as well as their own gain. Subjects are informed that in each round their groups
survive with a 50% chance, that this process is entirely random, and that every change is permanent
 groups that disappear cannot re-appear in the future. In all rounds following round 1, an
announcement prior to the initial stage reminds subjects whether their group has changed with
respect to the previous period. The important issue of the asymmetry of information about players'
past behavior between maintained and newly formed groups is addressed in the following way.
Before stage (i), members of newly formed pairs are informed about the contribution recently
made by their current group member in his former group.5 Although the extent of historical
information may vary between new and old pairs due to the randomness of group re-matching,
this design maintains the minimum level of knowledge about group members' past.6
Communication condition. The communication condition (CC) encompasses the three stages
forming BC, as well as the current-group-status reminder. In addition, in stage (iv) subjects are
asked to express their opinion about a group member's decision by assigning a certain number of
points (between 0 and 10) to him. Experimental instructions state that a high number of points
expresses disapproval: 10 points correspond to the strongest disapproval, while 0 points correspond
to the weakest disapproval, and that assigned points do not aﬀect either participant's gains for the
experiment. Then, each subject is informed about the number of points he received from the other
group member. If groups change between periods t− 1 and t, prior to stage (i) subjects not only
learn about the decision taken by their current group member in t−1 (like in BC), but also about
the number of points he received.
3.2 Experimental procedures
The experiment involves a total of 12 sessions (6 for BC and 6 for CC), each comprising 8 subjects.
I use a round-robin matching protocol (ensuring that every two subjects have the opportunity to
interact during the experiment) and the random group survival rule outlined above. Consequently,
the structure of group matching and the number of rounds may diﬀer between sessions. In order
to control for the eﬀects of these variations, I use six independent, randomly generated matching
5Instructions (translated from French to English) are provided as a supplementary material.
6Another advantage of the present design is related to reputation-building. One may argue that this design may
involve reputation-building. However, even if subjects indeed try to establish a reputation, this incentive remains
constant throughout the entire experiment: across diﬀerent kinds of pairs  newly established and preserved, as well
as under diﬀerent communication conditions. Yet, this symmetry is another important reﬁnement with respect to
the usual partner-stranger comparison in which reputation-building may unobservedly arise in the former scheme,
but not in the latter.
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sequences (henceforth labeled Game 1, . . ., Game 6 ) and run two separate sessions for each of
them: one implementing BC and one implementing CC.7 Subjects are informed that the game
contains between 10 and 16 rounds and that its length is determined randomly. In practice, sessions
contain between 11 and 15 rounds, and the pairs of subjects interact for up to ﬁve consecutive
rounds.8
At the beginning of each session, participants are randomly assigned to their computers and
asked to ﬁll in a small personal questionnaire containing basic questions about their age, gender,
education, etc. The written instructions are then read aloud. Before starting, subjects are also
asked to ﬁll in a quiz assessing their understanding of the game they are about to play. Once the
quiz and all remaining questions are answered, the experiment begins.
Once all pairs complete a round of the game, subjects are informed that either a new round
will start, or the experiment will end. In the latter case, a single round is randomly drawn and
each participant receives the amount in EUR corresponding to his gains in that round (converted
from ECU to EUR using an exchange rate 1 ECU = 0.40 EUR), plus a show-up fee equal to 5
EUR.
All sessions took place in the lab of the University of Paris 1 (LEEP) in July 2012. The re-
cruitment of subjects was carried out via LEEP database among individuals who have successfully
completed the registration process on laboratory's website.9 Among 96 participants, 51 are male
and 45 are female. 63 participant are students, of which 67% might have some background in game
theory due to their ﬁeld of study.10 82 subjects had taken part in experiments organized in LEEP
in the past. Participants' average age is roughly 25. No subject participated in more than one
experimental session. Each session lasted about 45 minutes with average earning of 12.20 Euros.
4 Results
This section establishes the principal results coming from individual- and group-level data analysis.
The main ﬁndings are as follows. First, the transmission of feedback involving disapproval points
foster the production of public goods. Second, the eﬀects of ex post communication on group
productivity and the within-group structure of contributions do not vary between the cases where
messages may or may not have a strategic (i.e. future-oriented) function.
7The exact structure of these sequences can be found in the supplementary material.
8In the remainder of the paper, I use the terms pair and group interchangeably.
9The recruitment uses Orsee Greiner (2004); the experiment is computerized through a software developed
under Regate Zeiliger (2000).
10Disciplines such as economics, engineering, management, political science, psychology, mathematics applied in
social science, mathematics, computer science, sociology, biology.
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Table 1: Average contributions by treatment and experimental game
Conditions Game 1 Game 2 Game 3 Game 4 Game 5 Game 6 Average p
Average contributions in round 1
Baseline 7.625 6.750 8.125 6.375 5.750 3.875 6.417 0.210
Evaluation 6.250 8.250 6.500 8.375 7.875 8.750 7.667
Overall average contributions
Baseline 5.000 2.900 4.420 3.083 6.010 2.846 3.942 0.046
Evaluation 4.083 7.783 6.045 6.325 9.135 8.029 6.938
Session details
Number of subjects 8 8 8 8 8 8
Number of rounds 12 15 11 15 12 13
Note. Columns 1-6 present average contributions in each experimental game, using data from round 1 (upper part) and all
rounds (middle part). The last two columns summarize these results and provide non-parametric tests for the signiﬁcance of
the eﬀect of treatment on contributions: the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test using individual observations in round
1, and Wilcoxon signed-rank test using game-level matched averages for the aggregate data (in order to account for the
potential sequence-speciﬁc eﬀects). The lower part of the table contains additional information on the number of subjects
and the length of each experimental game.
4.1 Individual behavior
Table 1 presents subjects' average contributions as a function of the structure of the experimental
game and the communication condition. In ﬁve experimental games out of six, the presence of non-
verbal feedback increases the average contribution. This shift in behavior is signiﬁcant at the 5%
level according to a Wilcoxon signed-rank test.11, 12 Then, the behavior of inexperienced players
is neutral to the treatment variable: a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test using individual
observations from round 1 does not reject the hypothesis that the distributions of subjects' choices
are the same in both experimental environments (p=0.210).13
Result 1. The average contribution in the communication condition is signiﬁcantly higher than
in the baseline condition. However, this eﬀect does not occur in the initial round.
To further investigate the behavioral transition caused by communication, Figure 1 compares
the distributions of contributed amounts in both experimental conditions. In BC, over 40% (251
out of 624) of decisions are zero contribution, as compared with less than 25% (148/624) in CC.
Moreover, contributions between 1 ECU and 4 ECU are more frequent in the former than in the
latter. The relationship between the two conditions becomes unstable until the threshold level
of 10 ECU, above which all values appear substantially more often in CC than in BC, including
the case in which the entire endowment is tranferred to the common pool (105 times in CC
11For each of the six games, this test matches the averge contributions observed in BC and in CC, and therefore
accounts for the eﬀects related to diﬀerent game structures.
12All p-values used in statistical analysis correspond to two-sided tests.
13This may suggest that the eﬀect of communication via disapproval points involves learning of conventions and
arises via procedural experience. An identical phenomenon is reported by Dugar (2010, 2013).
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Figure 1: Distribution of contributions across treatments
Note. For each experimental treatment, data contain 624
observations from 6 experimental sessions. Contributions are
given in ECU.
against 63 times in BT). In addition, Figure 2 suggests that this phenomenon is robust to the way
pairs are matched prior to interacting. Within each experimental condition, one observes similar
distributions of contributions in newly formed and retained pairs. On the other hand, the key
diﬀerence between both conditions observed in Figure 1 prevails: in the presence of feedback the
frequency of low contributions is substantially lower than without feedback, while the opposite
holds for high contributions.14
4.2 Group behavior
In order to uncover the cause of the transition in subjects' decision-making, let us now turn
to exploring the behavior of groups in which this decision-making (either alone or couple with
communication) take place. This analysis is aimed at providing statistical tests of the signaling
and non-monetary sanctioning hypotheses via parametric regression models. The core instruments
are embedded in the 2 × 2 design of the experiment: the ﬁrst dimension being the presence of
random 1Re−matchingtt−1 (set to 1 if re-matching occurs, 0 otherwise) of pairs prior to round t,
while the second  the presence of ex post communication treatment (1CC = 1 for communication
14For instance, zero contributions are observed 134 times in BC in the absence of prior re-matching of pairs, and
110 times had re-matching occurred. Analogous ﬁgures in CC are 80 and 65. Moving to the opposite extreme,
contributions of 15 occur 31, 26, 54 and 42 times in the four respective cases.
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Figure 2: Contributions, communication and re-matching
Note. For each combination of experimental condition (BC or CC) and
pair status (re-matching occurs before period t or not), data contain 288
observations from 6 experimental sessions. Contributions are given in ECU.
condition, 0 otherwise). The statistical analysis focuses on two dependent variables:
Contributions gathered by players i and j interacting at time t (cit + c
j
t). The signaling role of
ex post communication may be conﬁrmed by the signiﬁcance of 1CC in maintained pairs, and a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the contributions accumulated in maintained and re-matched pairs
when 1CC = 1  both of which indicate that the eﬀect of feedback on group productivity depends
on the continuity of interaction. On the other hand, the absence of a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
contributions in maintained and re-matched pairs when 1CC = 1 points towards the importance
of the non-monetary sanctioning hypothesis. These mechanisms are tested in Model 1.
The absolute diﬀerence between the contributions of players i and j who form a pair at time t
(|cit − cjt |). Model 2 provides a complementary test for the signaling hypothesis. If non-verbal
feedback operates as an eﬃcient signaling mechanism, then it should facilitate players' mutual
strategic adaptation resulting in more equilibrated contributions within pairs. Consequently, the
contributions in maintained groups playing under the communication condition should involve less
intra-group inequality than elsewhere.
Table 2 summarizes the estimates from both models.15 Model 1 reveals that the presence of
communication increases the provision of public good in both retained and re-matched groups
15Supplementary material provides an additional speciﬁcation  double-censored tobit  as an alternative to the
OLS estimates reported in Tables 2-4. The OLS speciﬁcation is more convervative regarding the measurement of
treatment eﬀects, and thus chosen for this analysis. However, all the eﬀects discussed in this section have been
captured by both models.
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Table 2: Determinants of group behavior
Model 1 Model 2
Dep. variable: cit + c
j
t |cit − cjt |
β β
Intercept (β0) 8.032 4.422*
1Re−matchingtt−1 (β1) 0.753 0.928*
1CC (β2) 6.375* 0.838
1CC × 1Re−matchingtt−1 (β3) -0.188 -0.785
Additional controls:
Round
3 -1.627 1.580
4 -0.938 0.938
5 -2.803** 0.551
6 -2.241** 0.551
7 -2.960** 0.080
8 -3.860** -0.839
9 -3.741*** 0.592
10 -5.205*** -0.976
11 -4.553** 0.488
12 -4.317*** 0.704
13 -4.587** 0.687
14 -3.550** 1.666
15 -4.334** 0.630
Game :
2 2.067 -0.616
3 1.228 -1.408
4 0.719 -1.268
5 6.636 -0.386
6 2.249 -1.263
N 576
R2 0.208 0.043
Note. OLS regressions using group-level observations. Dependent variable in Model 1 is the sum of contributions of players
i and j forming a group at time t (cit + c
j
t ), whereas Model 2 uses the absolute diﬀerence of contributions within this group
(|cit − cjt |). Columns contain model's coeﬃcients (β) and corresponding p-values, with */**/*** indicating signiﬁcance at
the 10%/5%/1% level. Explanatory variables include a dummy indicating the occurrence of group re-matching prior to
(1Re−matchingtt−1 ) and another dummy indicating whether the game involves ex post communication (1CC), as well as their
interaction. Models also control for the round and matching-sequence eﬀects, with Round 2 and Game 1 being set as reference
points and omitted in regressions. Data include observation from round 2 onwards. Standard errors are clustered at the session
level (12 clusters) and are corrected using leave-one-out jackknife.
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Table 3: Contributions and historical information in newly formed pairs
Intercept (θ0) 4.133*** 7.200*** 4.304**
Group member' s:
Contributiont−1 (θ1) 0.228***  0.291**
Received_pointst−1 (θ2)  -0.080 0.158
N 288
R2 0.053 0.003 0.060
Note. OLS regressions of player's contribution in t on the historical information about the current group member: his
contribution in t− 1 and the number of points he received in t− 1. Columns contain model's coeﬃcients (θ), with */**/***
indicating signiﬁcance at the 10%/5%/1% level. Data come from newly matched pairs. Standard errors are estimated using
observations clustered at the session level (6 clusters in total) and corrected using leave-one-out jackknife.
(H0 : β2 = 0, p = 0.058, H0 : β2 + β3 = 0, p = 0.023, respecively). Moreover, the group
behavior in the communication condition does not depend on the previous occurence of re-matching
(H0 : β1 + β3 = 0, p = 0.497). Altogether, this evidence favours the non-monetary sanctioning
explanation over the signaling hypothesis: the impact of communication on the group behavior is
signiﬁcant, but does not depend on players' ability to transmit strategic signals.
Model 2 provides evidence in the same vein: the within-group inequality in maintained pairs
does not diﬀer systematically between BC and CC. One cannot reject the joint hypothesis that the
level of inequality in maintained pairs is not aﬀected by the presence of ex post communication,
and that the level of inequality in the communication condition does not depend on the nature of
groups' re-matching (H0 : β2 = 0 ∩ β1 + β3 = 0, p = 0.464). On the other hand, the contributions
within newly formed groups in the baseline condition tend to be more divergent than in retained
groups (H0 : β1 = 0, p = 0.099), which suggests that the experience acquired over the course of
a continuous interaction improves players' capacity of strategic adaptation, and that this eﬀect is
superseded by the ex post exchange of messages.
Result 2. The eﬀect of communication on group productivity and players' strategic adaptation
within groups does not depend on the availability of future-oriented signals.
Finally, both regressions also reveal interesting time trends: a gradual decay in the production
of public goods in Model 116, and no systematic variations in within-group inequalities in Model
2.
16This observation echoes previous experiments on public goods with and without feedback mechanisms. See, for
instance, Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003); Dugar (2013); Peeters and Vorsatz (2013).
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Figure 3: Sent disapproval points and the relative size of contribution
Note. Data come from 6 sessions and contain 288 observations for each
type of group. Contributions are given in ECU.
4.3 Does re-matching preclude strategic signaling? A simple test of the altru-
istic signaling hypothesis
Note, the underlying assumption of the above analysis is that the transmission of strategic signals is
only possible in continuous interactions. However, since players in newly established pairs observe
the degree of disapproval their group members received in their old pairs, one may also consider an
alternative scenario  altruistic signaling  where disapproval points are utilized to label players
who enter into a new interaction. More precisely, subsequent members of each subject's pair may
transmit cues about this person to their successors and adapt their decisions according to the cues
transmitted by their predecessors.
To test this hypothesis, the data from newly matched pairs are used to regress the individual
contributions on the historical information held by each player about his current group member:
his past contribution and the number of disapproval points he received in the previous period. The
estimates are presented in Table 3. This simple empirical test suggests that re-matching precludes
the strategic use of these points: while group members' past behavior matters for subjects' choices,
disapproval points the former received in their previous groups do not.
4.4 Determinants of expressed disapproval
This section addresses two central questions related to the formation of ex post messages: (i) what
is the relationship between the content of feedback and underlying contributions, and (ii) does
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this relationship vary between retained and re-matched groups? The answer to the ﬁrst question
is provided by Figure 3 which presents the average number of points sent by subject to his group
member as a function of his deviation from other group member's contribution, and the outcome
of the random draw that determines group's future. Under both matching scenarios, the overall
pattern seems rather coherent: the number of sent disapproval points grows as the diﬀerence
between sender's and receiver's contributions grows.
Answering the second question requires a more formal insight into the process of message forma-
tion. For this sake, I estimate a linear model representing the number of points sent by a player in
round t as a function of his Group_member′s_contributiont, as well as its relative size within his
group  i.e. the magnitude of Sender′s_positive_deviationt or Sender′s_absolute_negative_deviationt
with respect to other group member's decision. The eﬀect of prospective re-matching is captured
by the variable 1Re−matchingt+1t (like before, set to 1 if re-matching is about to occur between t
and t+ 1, a 0 otherwise) as well as its interactions with the above variables.
In the absence of re-matching prior to the upcoming interaction, players send more disapproval
points the less their group members contribute (H0 : γ1 = 0, p = 0.002), and the more they
contribute themselves relative to their group members (H0 : γ2 = 0, p = 0.010). The magnitude of
own negative deviation (in absolute terms), in turn, does not play a signiﬁcant role in the process
of point attribution (H0 : γ3 = 0, p = 0.329). Importantly, these eﬀects do not change due to
re-matching. One may not reject the joint hypothesis that the prospect of group re-matching does
not change the relationship between one's relative contribution and the number of disapproval
points he sends (H0 : γ5 = 0 ∩ γ6 = 0 ∩ γ7 = 0, p = 0.356).
Result 3. Ex post disapproval points are assigned in an informative and coherent manner: low
contributors receive more disapproval points than high contributors. This pattern of point attri-
bution does not vary signiﬁcantly between pairs that are about to cease and continue interacting.
5 Summary and discussion
Recent developments in economic research suggest that communication may mitigate selﬁshness
in social dilemmas, and the source of this phenomenon is often explained as an emotional reaction
communication evokes in humans. For instance, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) and Vanberg
(2008) argue that ex ante communication may reduce the scope of opportunistic behavior due
to agents' aversion to lying, while Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) relate this transition to guilt
aversion due to which agents experience disutility from letting down others' expectations.
The present study provides new evidence on the behavioral eﬀect of communication in social
dilemmas First, echoing the previous ﬁndings by Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003)
and Dugar (2013) (and notwithstanding the ﬁndings by Peeters and Vorsatz (2013)), the paper
reports that the availability of a feedback mechanism involving costless disapproval points substan-
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Table 4: Sent disapproval points and the relative size of contribution
Intercept (γ0) 6.227***
Group_member′s_contributiont (γ1) -0.380***
Sender′s_positive_deviationt (γ2) 0.167***
Sender′s_absolute_negative_deviationt (γ3) 0.075
1
Re−matchingt+1t
(γ4) -0.536
1
Re−matchingt+1t
×Group_members′s_contributiont (γ5) 0.047
1
Re−matchingt+1t
× Sender′s_positive_deviationt (γ6) 0.010
1
Re−matchingt+1t
× Sender′s_absolute_negative_deviationt (γ7) -0.138
N 576
R2 0.361
Note. OLS regressions of the number of points sent in t on variables indicating the level of Group_member′s_contributiont,
the value of Sender′s_positive_deviationt or Sender′s_absolute_negative_deviationt, a dummy indicating the occurence
of 1
Re−matchingt+1t
as well as its interactions with the three above variables. */**/*** indicate coeﬃcients' signiﬁcance at
the 10%/5%/1% level. Standard errors are estimated using observations clustered at the session level (6 clusters in total) and
corrected using leave-one-out jackknife.
tially reduces opportunistic behavior in a repeated VCM game. Second, it oﬀers a new angle for
understanding this important behavioral process and to test two potential (and non-excludable)
factors behind the behavioral eﬀect of feedback: ﬁrst, the preference for approval/aversion to
disapproval, understood as non-monetary utility or disutility drawn from others' opinions about
own behavior; second, the transmission of strategic signals (such as threats) linked to future in-
teractions. It builds on the intuition that under both a repeated interaction within ﬁxed groups
of players (partner protocol) and interactions with constantly changing groups (stranger proto-
col) ex post communication may be used for non-monetary sanctioning or rewarding, but only
the former also allows for future-oriented strategic signaling. While retaining these diﬀerent fea-
tures of communication, this new design neutralizes the undesired eﬀects of matching protocols
on contributions.
The experimental literature lacks unequivocal evidence on the root underlying the behavioral
eﬀect of ex post communication in repeated social dilemmas. For instance, Masclet, Noussair,
Tucker, and Villeval (2003) suggest that both of these mechanisms may inﬂuence subjects' be-
havior, Peeters and Vorsatz (2013) highlight the role of strategic information transmission, while
Dugar (2013) points towards the importance of the utility or disutility induced by others' judg-
ments about own actions. Data from this experiment do not support the signaling hypothesis,
favouring the non-monetary punishment explanation instead. First, the provision of public good
is invariant across groups that may exchange future-oriented messages and those whose messages
cannot be future-oriented. Although communication increases the production of public good irre-
spectively of the continuity of group's interaction, it does not improve players' strategic adaptation
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(measured as the within-group inequality of contributions), even if interactions extend throughout
multiple periods. Second, the relationship between one's relative contribution and the result-
ing level of others' disapproval is coherent (low contributors face stronger disapproval than high
contributors) and does not vary as a function of the continuity of interaction.
In a broader perspective, this experiment also contributes to furthering our understanding
of the determinants of the behavioral response to communication. Charness and Dufwenberg
(2010) discuss two implementations of pre-play, cheap-talk, natural language communication in a
trust game: an unstructured (free-form) protocol where (almost) any content may be transmit-
ted between players, and a ﬁxed-form protocol which only allows for single-phrase, standardized
"bare" promises. Their conclusion is that only unrestricted communication may induce emotional
reaction from subjects (which, in their study, is explained as an emotional cost caused by lying-
aversion). This conjecture ﬁnds support in some experiments contrasting non-verbal and verbal ex
ante communication. Wilson and Sell (1997) ﬁnd no eﬀect of numerical pre-play communication
in an experimental VCM game. Using similar setup, Bochet, Page, and Putterman (2006) again
observe no eﬀect of numerical pre-play announcements, while verbal pre-play communication is
found to foster cooperativeness. Finally, Ben-Ner, Putterman, and Ren (2011) ﬁnd that both
mechanisms improve the eﬃciency of subjects' behavior in a trust game, with verbal communi-
cation systematically outperforming numerical communication. Ex post communication based on
natural language was also found to aﬀect subjects' emotions in social dilemmas (Ellingsen and
Johannesson, 2008; Xiao and Houser, 2009; López-Pérez and Vorsatz, 2010). On the other hand,
Dugar (2010, 2013) suggests that non-verbal ex post communication may also refer to emotions.
An important result pinned down by the present experiment diﬀers at face value from Charness
and Dufwenberg's insight, echoing Dugar's conjecture. Even a structured, artiﬁcial and wordless
method of expressing own judgment  such as the utilization of evaluation points  creates an
environment in which aversion to others' disapproval may refrain opportunistic behavior in social
dilemmas. A more systematic comparison of verbal and non-verbal feedback mechanisms could
certainly constitute a desirable avenue for future research.
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Supplementary material
Written instructions
Author's note: BC (EC) at the beginning of a paragraph indicates that this part is speciﬁc to baseline
condition (evaluation condition)
You are about to take part in an experiment in which you can earn money. Your gains will depend on
your decisions, as well as on the decisions made by other participants.
Before starting, we would like to ask you to answer a few standard questions (concerning your age,
education, profession, . . . ) that will help us to get to know you better. This information, as well as the
amount of your gains in this experiment, will remain strictly conﬁdential and anonymous.
Please, ﬁll in the questionnaire using the interface on your computer screen, which is divided into three
parts:
• In the top section, you will ﬁnd information that might help you in making decisions.
• In the middle section, you will submit your decisions by clicking on a relevant button.
• In the bottom section, you will see all your decisions and gains from previous rounds of the experiment.
Thank you.
The experiment
The experiment consists of several rounds. The total number of rounds is random and might vary
between 10 and 16. In each round, participants are divided into groups of two. In each round (more
precisely, in Stage 2 described below) a random draw decides that:
• either your group will not change in the next round;
• or that your group will change in the next round. In order to form your new group, another
participant will be chosen at random among participant who have never been part of your group
before.
Both events are equally probable  each occurs with a 50% chance.
In every round, each participant's gain is determined as follows. At the beginning of round, every
person possesses the initial endowment of 15 ECU (Experimental Currency Unit).
Members of each group may create a common pool. Each participant freely chooses his level of contri-
bution to the pool that may range between 0 ECU and 15 ECU. The total amount gathered in the pool is
then multiplied by 1.5 and divided equally among group members.
For instance, if you are participant i who contributed Ni, and the other member of your group, par-
ticipant j, contributed Mj , then your gain (Gaini) equals:
Gaini = 15− 0.25×Ni + 0.75×Mj (2)
The Table provided below presents your gain in ECU in a given period as a function of your level of
contribution and the other group member's level of contribution.
19
T
ab
le
5:
Y
ou
r
ga
in
in
E
C
U
in
a
gi
ve
n
p
er
io
d
as
a
fu
n
ct
io
n
of
yo
u
r
d
ec
is
io
n
an
d
yo
u
r
gr
ou
p
m
em
b
er
's
d
ec
is
io
n
Y
o
u
r
g
ro
u
p
m
em
b
er
's
le
v
el
o
f
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
1
4
1
5
0
1
5
1
5
.7
5
1
6
.5
1
7
.2
5
1
8
1
8
.7
5
1
9
.5
2
0
.2
5
2
1
2
1
.7
5
2
2
.5
2
3
.2
5
2
4
2
4
.7
5
2
5
.5
2
6
.2
5
1
1
4
.7
5
1
5
.5
1
6
.2
5
1
7
1
7
.7
5
1
8
.5
1
9
.2
5
2
0
2
0
.7
5
2
1
.5
2
2
.2
5
2
3
2
3
.7
5
2
4
.5
2
5
.2
5
2
6
2
1
4
.5
1
5
.2
5
1
6
1
6
.7
5
1
7
.5
1
8
.2
5
1
9
1
9
.7
5
2
0
.5
2
1
.2
5
2
2
2
2
.7
5
2
3
.5
2
4
.2
5
2
5
2
5
.7
5
3
1
4
.2
5
1
5
1
5
.7
5
1
6
.5
1
7
.2
5
1
8
1
8
.7
5
1
9
.5
2
0
.2
5
2
1
2
1
.7
5
2
2
.5
2
3
.2
5
2
4
2
4
.7
5
2
5
.5
4
1
4
1
4
.7
5
1
5
.5
1
6
.2
5
1
7
1
7
.7
5
1
8
.5
1
9
.2
5
2
0
2
0
.7
5
2
1
.5
2
2
.2
5
2
3
2
3
.7
5
2
4
.5
2
5
.2
5
5
1
3
.7
5
1
4
.5
1
5
.2
5
1
6
1
6
.7
5
1
7
.5
1
8
.2
5
1
9
1
9
.7
5
2
0
.5
2
1
.2
5
2
2
2
2
.7
5
2
3
.5
2
4
.2
5
2
5
Y
o
u
r
6
1
3
.5
1
4
.2
5
1
5
1
5
.7
5
1
6
.5
1
7
.2
5
1
8
1
8
.7
5
1
9
.5
2
0
.2
5
2
1
2
1
.7
5
2
2
.5
2
3
.2
5
2
4
2
4
.7
5
le
v
el
7
1
3
.2
5
1
4
1
4
.7
5
1
5
.5
1
6
.2
5
1
7
1
7
.7
5
1
8
.5
1
9
.2
5
2
0
2
0
.7
5
2
1
.5
2
2
.2
5
2
3
2
3
.7
5
2
4
.5
o
f
8
1
3
1
3
.7
5
1
4
.5
1
5
.2
5
1
6
1
6
.7
5
1
7
.5
1
8
.2
5
1
9
1
9
.7
5
2
0
.5
2
1
.2
5
2
2
2
2
.7
5
2
3
.5
2
4
.2
5
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
9
1
2
.7
5
1
3
.5
1
4
.2
5
1
5
1
5
.7
5
1
6
.5
1
7
.2
5
1
8
1
8
.7
5
1
9
.5
2
0
.2
5
2
1
2
1
.7
5
2
2
.5
2
3
.2
5
2
4
1
0
1
2
.5
1
3
.2
5
1
4
1
4
.7
5
1
5
.5
1
6
.2
5
1
7
1
7
.7
5
1
8
.5
1
9
.2
5
2
0
2
0
.7
5
2
1
.5
2
2
.2
5
2
3
2
3
.7
5
1
1
1
2
.2
5
1
3
1
3
.7
5
1
4
.5
1
5
.2
5
1
6
1
6
.7
5
1
7
.5
1
8
.2
5
1
9
1
9
.7
5
2
0
.5
2
1
.2
5
2
2
2
2
.7
5
2
3
.5
1
2
1
2
1
2
.7
5
1
3
.5
1
4
.2
5
1
5
1
5
.7
5
1
6
.5
1
7
.2
5
1
8
1
8
.7
5
1
9
.5
2
0
.2
5
2
1
2
1
.7
5
2
2
.5
2
3
.2
5
1
3
1
1
.7
5
1
2
.5
1
3
.2
5
1
4
1
4
.7
5
1
5
.5
1
6
.2
5
1
7
1
7
.7
5
1
8
.5
1
9
.2
5
2
0
2
0
.7
5
2
1
.5
2
2
.2
5
2
3
1
4
1
1
.5
1
2
.2
5
1
3
1
3
.7
5
1
4
.5
1
5
.2
5
1
6
1
6
.7
5
1
7
.5
1
8
.2
5
1
9
1
9
.7
5
2
0
.5
2
1
.2
5
2
2
2
2
.7
5
1
5
1
1
.2
5
1
2
1
2
.7
5
1
3
.5
1
4
.2
5
1
5
1
5
.7
5
1
6
.5
1
7
.2
5
1
8
1
8
.7
5
1
9
.5
2
0
.2
5
2
1
2
1
.7
5
2
2
.5
20
What happens in each round
At the beginning of each round (accept for the ﬁrst one), the result of the random draw that took place in
the previous period is recalled to each participant. Each participant is informed that:
• either his group remains the same as in the previous round;
• BC: or in the ongoing round he will play with a diﬀerent person. In this case, each participant is
also informed about the level of contribution of his current group member in the previous period.
• EC: or in the ongoing round he will play with a diﬀerent person. In this case, each participant is
also informed about the level of contribution of his current group member and the number of points
he received in the previous period.
Every round contains 3 stages:
Stage 1. Each participant chooses his level of contribution to the pool.
Stage 2. Each participant observes the outcomes of a random draw that determines his group in the next
round.
Stage 3. BC: Finally, every participant is informed about his group member's level of contribution and his
own gain for the round.
EC:
• At the beginning of this stage, every participant is informed about his group member's level of
contribution and his own gain for the round.
• Then, each participant has to possibility to express his opinion about the other group member
by assigning him a certain number of points. A high number of points expresses dis-
approval: 10 points correspond to the strongest disapproval, 0 points correspond
to the weakest disapproval. To do this, you should select the number of points on your
screen and press OK button to conﬁrm your choice. The choice of the number of points has
no impact on either participants' gains in the experiment.
• Finally, every participant is informed about the number that were assigned to him
by the other group member.
At the end of each round, a message on your screen will inform you that either a new round is about
to start, or that the experiment ends.
Payment of your earnings
At the end of the experiment, one round is selected at random. Each participant receives a sum
in EUR corresponding to the amount he earned in this round, converted from ECU to EUR using an
exchange rate 1 ECU = 0.40 EUR, plus a bonus of 5 e for completing the experiment. All payments are
made individually and in cash.
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For obvious reasons, you are not allowed to talk during the experiment. Participants who
violate this rule will be excluded from the experiment and all payments. It is crucial that you understand
perfectly the rules of this experiment. Should you have any questions to ask, please raise your hand.
Thank you for your participation!
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Evolution of contributions in experimental games
Figures 4a-f suggest that treatment eﬀect is stable over time: in Games 2, 5, and 6 contributions in
communication condition dominate those in baseline condition in all rounds; in Games 3 and 4 this tendency
is reversed in only 3 rounds out of 11, and 1 round out of 15, respectively. Solely in Game 1 the relationship
is more ambiguous.
Figure 4: Evolution of average contribution by game and treatment
(a) Game 1 (b) Game 2
(c) Game 3 (d) Game 4
(e) Game 5 (f) Game 6
Note. Vertical lines indicate rounds after which groups are being re-matched. Solid
line indicates baseline condition, dashed line indicates communication condition.
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Robustness check: OLS vs. double-censored tobit regressions
This section provides a comparison of diﬀerent speciﬁcations (OLS vs. doubled-censored tobit) of regression
models presented in Tables 2-4. For each model, the columns contain the coeﬃcients from an OLS regres-
sion, as well as the coeﬃcients and average marginal eﬀects (ME) from a double-censored tobit regression.
*/**/*** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%/5%/1% level. Altogether, this evidence suggests that
both estimation methods yield similar results, with OLS being more conservative in the assessment of
treatment eﬀects and therefore used in the paper.
Table 6: Determinants of group behavior: extension of Table 2
Model 1 Model 2
Dep. variable: cit + c
j
t |cit − cjt |
βOLS βTobit METobit βOLS βTobit METobit
Intercept (β0) 8.032 6.741  4.422* 3.534 
1Re−matchingtt−1 (β1) 0.753 1.996* 1.365* 0.928* 1.659* 1.184**
1CC (β2) 6.375* 7.652* 6.177** 0.838 1.229 0.877
1CC × 1Re−matchingtt−1 (β3) -0.188 -1.013 -0.816 -0.785 -1.311 -0.935
Additional controls:
Round
3 -1.627 -2.211* -1.873** 1.580 1.979 1.467
4 -0.938 -1.208 -1.029 0.938 0.911 0.659
5 -2.803** -3.171** -2.670** 0.551 0.537 0.385
6 -2.241** -2.740** -2.313* 0.551 0.708 0.510
7 -2.960** -3.517** -2.952*** 0.080 0.061 0.043
8 -3.860** -4.883** -4.050*** -0.839 -1.359 -0.916
9 -3.741*** -4.788*** -3.975*** 0.592 0.469 0.335
10 -5.205*** -6.339*** -5.175*** -0.976 -1.614 -1.077
11 -4.553** -5.694** -4.683*** 0.488 0.434 0.310
12 -4.317*** -5.594*** -4.606*** 0.704 0.602 0.433
13 -4.587** -5.693** -4.683*** 0.687 0.508 0.364
14 -3.550** -5.123** -4.241*** 1.666 1.326 0.969
15 -4.334** -5.829** -4.787*** 0.630 0.501 0.359
Game :
2 2.067 2.569 2.019 -0.616 -0.688 -0.504
3 1.228 1.624 1.258 -1.408 -1.603 -1.146
4 0.719 1.421 1.098 -1.268 -1.139 -0.825
5 6.636 8.013 6.633 -0.386 -0.328 -0.242
6 2.249 2.789 2.198 -1.263 -1.265 -0.913
N 576
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Table 7: Contributions and historical information in newly formed pairs: extension of Table 3
Determinants: θOLS θTobit METobit θOLS θTobit METobit θOLS θTobit METobit
Intercept (θ0) 4.133*** 2.320**  7.200*** 6.976***  4.304** 2.932 
Group member's:
Contributiont−1 (θ1) 0.228*** 0.344*** 0.201***    0.291** 0.408* 0.260**
Received_pointst−1 (θ2)    -0.080 -0.140 -0.089 0.158 0.193 0.123
N 288
Table 8: Sent disapproval points and the relative size of contribution: extension of Table 4
Determinants: γOLS γTobit METobit
Intercept (γ0) 6.227*** 7.831*** 
Group_member′s_contributiont (γ1) -0.380*** -0.766*** -0.433***
Sender′s_positive_deviationt (γ2) 0.167*** 0.314*** 0.182***
Sender′s_absolute_negative_deviationt (γ3) 0.075 0.128 0.074
1
Re−matchingt+1t
(γ4) -0.536 -1.113 -0.644
1
Re−matchingt+1t
×Group_members′s_contributiont (γ5) 0.047 0.066 0.038
1
Re−matchingt+1t
× Sender′s_positive_deviationt (γ6) 0.010 0.048 0.028
1
Re−matchingt+1t
× Sender′s_absolute_negative_deviationt (γ7) -0.138 -0.220 -0.127
N 576
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